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Strengthening Trust and Credibility in the Direct Selling Channel: The Importance of Industry Self-Regulation

By Peter Marinello

For over a century, American businesses have embraced the belief that industries should be accountable for maintaining their own ethical standards. This principle is especially ingrained in the direct selling channel, where consumer trust and entrepreneurial opportunity have long gone hand in hand.

Since the 1970s, the Direct Selling Association (DSA) has upheld this commitment through a comprehensive Code of Ethics, overseen by an independent administrator, which governs everything from marketing practices to income disclosures.

Even before the rise of social media and digital advertising transformed the marketplace, DSA member companies recognized that trust is not imposed by regulation—it’s cultivated through consistent, principled behavior. Strengthening trust in the direct selling channel requires companies and their independent salesforce members to uphold ethical, transparent, and substantiated marketing practices.

Central to this effort is BBB National Programs’ Direct Selling Self-Regulatory Council (DSSRC), an independent oversight program created in 2019 in partnership with DSA. DSSRC offers a robust and technologically advanced self-regulatory model that builds on the channel’s existing business ethics foundation. Leveraging modern internet-wide monitoring tools, DSSRC reviews online direct-selling promotional content to identify potentially misleading product and income claims and engages with companies to resolve issues quickly before they escalate.

In an era where digital misinformation travels at lightning speed, the channel’s continued support for independent, proactive self-regulation is not only prudent—it is essential to preserving trust and credibility.

This article explores the value of industry-led self-regulation as a tool for promoting business accountability, protecting consumers, and strengthening public trust. In the direct selling sector, DSSRC exemplifies this commitment, working independently, but alongside companies, trade associations, and compliance professionals to up-hold ethical standards and proactively address emerging challenges. By complementing government oversight, self-regulatory initiatives like DSSRC demonstrate how independent monitoring and accountability can support sustainable business practices to reinforce confidence in the industry over the long term.

Understanding Industry Self-Regulation

At BBB National Programs, industry self-regulation refers to a structured, voluntary process in which industries adopt and adhere to standards of conduct that promote responsible business practices, protect consumers, and address potentially deceptive or misleading behavior—often before regulatory action becomes necessary.

Effective self-regulation is rooted in independent oversight, transparent procedures, and a credible commitment to accountability. It empowers industries to lead in shaping ethical norms while building a culture of compliance.

Self-regulation initially emerged in the US as a proactive response to consumer protection challenges. In 1971, the National Advertising Division (NAD) was established by leaders in the advertising industry to set a new benchmark for independent review of truth-in-advertising claims. Administered by BBB National Programs, NAD has long served as a reliable and efficient forum for resolving advertising disputes and upholding standards of truth and accuracy—offering an alternative to the time and expense associated with litigation.

It is important to recognize that self-regulation is not a replacement for government enforcement. Rather, it acts as a complementary safeguard, offering a proactive approach that allows industries to identify and correct problematic practices early. Regulatory agencies such as the FTC have recognized the value of credible independent self-regulation, often referring matters to self-regulatory programs or factoring voluntary compliance into their enforcement decisions.

Self-regulation delivers substantial benefits to businesses, consumers, and regulators alike.

  • It promotes consumer confidence by signaling that companies are committed to ethical, transparent, and credible business practices. This assurance is particularly critical in industries such as direct selling, where independent salesforce members are on the front lines of customer engagement.
  • For government stakeholders, self-regulation can reduce the burden on regulatory agencies by independently resolving routine or lower risk matters.
  • Self-regulation can serve as an early-warning system for regulators, flagging and addressing emerging issues before they become widespread.
  • It provides flexible, real-time guidance informed by industry expertise, ensuring that compliance expectations keep pace with innovation and evolving business practices.

Ultimately, industry self-regulation—when done right—bridges the gap between the industry stakeholders and public accountability, reinforcing ethical standards that benefit the marketplace as a whole. By allowing businesses to reconcile misleading or unsubstantiated claims early, advertising self-regulation programs help prevent consumer harm, level the playing field for reputable business to engage with consumers and support the broader public interest.

The Direct Selling Industry: Scale, Reach, and Challenges

Direct selling is a global method of marketing and retailing goods and services that takes place outside of a fixed retail location. It typically involves independent salesforce members—often referred to as distributors, consultants, or ambassadors —who engage in person-to-person sales, whether through in-home demonstrations, online platforms, or social networks. Beyond selling products, direct selling offers individuals the opportunity to build a business with low entry barriers, flexible hours, and the potential for supplemental income.

The industry operates at significant scale. According to the World Federation of Direct Selling Associations, the global direct selling market surpassed $167 billion in sales in recent years, with more than 100 million independent sellers participating worldwide. In the US alone, DSA reports that tens of millions of individuals are engaged in the channel.

DSSRC’s Oversight Role

The creation of DSSRC in 2019 was driven by the direct selling channel’s recognition of the need and desire to demonstrate continued commitment to ethical conduct and to modernize business compliance practices for companies across and outside of DSA membership. Rooted in the belief that integrity and responsible conduct drive sustainable growth, DSA and its member companies recognized the importance of enhancing consumer and regulatory trust through transparent, responsible business and marketing practices.

DSSRC was established as a proactive initiative to reinforce the industry’s values expressed in the DSA Code of Ethics and ensure that direct sellers’ product and income claims align with high standards of integrity and accountability— reinforcing the central role that trust and transparency play in the direct selling channel’s long-term success.

To create concrete impact, DSA partnered with BBB National Programs to create DSSRC as an independently administered self-regulatory program. Serving as an impartial monitor of the marketplace and independent of DSA, DSSRC reviews income and product claims made by companies and their independent salesforce members, addresses complaints, and refers matters to regulators when appropriate. This initiative provides a transparent and effective mechanism for accountability.

Pillars of Effective Self-Regulation

For self-regulation to be a meaningful force in promoting trust and integrity in the direct selling channel, it must be built on four foundational pillars: credibility, transparency, accountability, and an objective standard of review.

Credibility begins with independence. To be most effective, a self-regulatory program should be administered by a third party that is free from industry influence, ensuring that decisions are impartial and grounded in established principles rather than business interests. This independence lends weight to its findings and garners respect from both industry participants and regulators.

Transparency is often the most challenging and important component in establishing a credible self-regulatory framework. Processes must be clearly defined, publicly accessible, and include the publication of decisions or outcomes to demonstrate how standards are applied. This openness not only builds confidence among stakeholders but also serves as a guiding framework for industry-wide compliance. DSSRC maintains program transparency through publicly available case decisions, annual reports that highlight the basis for DSSRC’s findings and the companies’ responses and the publication of industry guidance.

Accountability ensures that businesses are held responsible for their conduct. A self-regulatory program must have effective mechanisms to address non-compliance and, when necessary, escalate unresolved matters to government agencies. Accountability is achieved by DSSRC through a structured referral system: when companies fail to respond, refuse to make the recommended changes, or cannot be located, DSSRC refers these matters to the FTC or the appropriate state attorney general.

Finally, an objective standard of review requires that all marketing claims, particularly those concerning income opportunities and product efficacy, are communicated truthfully and accurately and are substantiated by reliable evidence.

As Drs. Linda and O.C. Ferrell of Auburn University outline in their article featured in this journal, self-regulation allows industries to proactively establish standards, build public trust, and maintain credibility without relying solely on external enforcement. This principle is demonstrated across a range of sectors.

  • The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) plays a vital role in safeguarding market integrity by enforcing ethical rules among broker-dealers and educating investors.
  • In the child-directed food marketing industry, BBB National Programs’ Children’s Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative (CFBAI) ensures that its participants only advertise foods to children that meet strict nutrition criteria and provides companies with a unique opportunity to regularly collaborate and engage with other like-minded industry leaders.
  • The Distilled Spirits Council of the U.S. (DISCUS) has implemented a rigorous code that governs advertising and marketing across the alcohol industry, setting standards that often exceed legal requirements.

Through these efforts, businesses demonstrate that self-regulation is not only a tool for compliance but also a commitment to ethical leadership and public accountability.

DSSRC similarly exemplifies these principles through a rigorous and impartial process. DSSRC proactively monitors the marketplace, identifying potentially problematic claims across digital platforms, including social media and independent salesforce communications. These findings trigger formal inquiries in which DSSRC reviews the claim in the context of the advertising, engages with the company, and issues a public case decision with recommendations for corrective action, when necessary.

Since its inception, DSSRC has identified over one million pieces of online content across various platforms related to direct selling companies and their independent salesforce members. DSSRC inquiries have resulted in the removal or substantial revision of more than 4,000 product and earnings claims disseminated by almost 500 different direct selling companies, significantly reducing the presence of misleading or unsubstantiated information in the marketplace.

A recent study conducted by Dr. Sandy Jap of the Goizueta Business School at Emory University examining the effectiveness of DSSRC found that the self-regulation program provides substantial benefits to DSA-member companies. An article highlighting Dr. Jap’s findings is also featured in this journal. Compared to non-member organizations, DSA members exhibit stronger adherence to responsible marketing practices. Dr. Sandy Jap’s independent analysis of DSSRC case data shows that DSA members make fewer product and income claims, respond to compliance concerns more promptly, and are less likely to require additional enforcement to resolve violations.

The study also revealed that DSA members resolve inquiries more efficiently and show higher levels of cooperation with DSSRC’s final decisions. Moreover, DSA members are significantly more proactive in modifying or removing problematic claims and addressing compliance issues, distinguishing them from non-DSA member companies.

Credible self-regulation promotes a level playing field by holding companies to consistent standards, discouraging bad actors, and reinforcing the integrity of the broader industry. For responsible businesses, self-regulation is not a shield against external scrutiny—it’s a strategic commitment to long-term sustainability, transparency, and public confidence.

Building a Foundation for Responsible Business Practices

Sustaining consumer trust in the direct selling channel requires more than reactive enforcement—it demands a long-term commitment to transparency, ethics, and responsible business practices. Since 2019, DSSRC has played a pivotal role in helping the channel establish and uphold these principles. By working collaboratively with companies and offering guidance grounded in legal and regulatory expectations, DSSRC has helped shift the channel toward a more proactive and preventative compliance culture.

A key component of this shift has been DSSRC’s focus on education and outreach. Through webinars, guidance, one-on-one consultations, and published case decisions, DSSRC provides companies and their independent salesforces with practical tools to identify and avoid problematic claims.

A cornerstone of this effort has been the development of practical compliance guidance for direct selling companies and their salesforce. DSSRC collaborated with industry stakeholders to produce the Guidance on Earnings Claims in the Direct Selling Industry and the Guidance on Income Disclosure Statements in the Direct Selling Industry. These resources serve as clear, objective frameworks for ensuring that income-related representations are presented in a way that avoids ambiguous or unsupported projections of expected income for prospective salesforce members interested in the direct selling business opportunity.

Through company education, DSSRC has also contributed to the decline of outdated and potentially misleading terms, such as “financial freedom,” “unlimited income,” and “career-level income,” which were once common in the channel. Today, companies are more mindful of the language used in promotional materials, leading to improved claim substantiation and enhanced consumer protection, building a stronger foundation for ethical growth across the channel.

As the direct selling channel continues to evolve, so must the standards that govern it. Emerging challenges from digital marketing, social media, influencer promotion, and international expansion require adaptive oversight. DSSRC has expanded its monitoring scope to include influencer content, global claims, and even AI-generated promotional materials.

By embracing new technologies and staying ahead of marketplace trends, DSSRC ensures that self-regulation remains relevant, effective, and responsive—providing timely guidance that helps companies navigate complexity while upholding consumer trust and ethical standards in a rapidly shifting environment.

As policymakers consider the future of consumer protection in the direct selling channel, several core principles of effective self-regulation should be reinforced.

  1. Self-regulation is most effective when it is truly independent and enforceable, with clear standards and consequences for non-compliance.
  2. Ongoing marketplace monitoring—such as that conducted by DSSRC—helps deter misconduct early, preventing consumer harm before it escalates.
  3. Collaboration between self-regulatory bodies and government agencies strengthens enforcement efforts, enabling a more efficient and responsive system of consumer protection.
  4. Education is essential; empowering companies and their salesforce with clear guidance fosters a culture of proactive compliance.

Conclusion

Robust, independent self-regulation is a powerful tool for reinforcing trust, credibility, and long-term success—particularly in dynamic distribution channels like direct selling. By taking ownership of high standards and ethical business practices, direct selling companies can demonstrate accountability, protect consumers, and elevate the reputation of the entire channel.

The work of DSSRC exemplifies how industry-led oversight—rooted in transparency, education, and proactive monitoring—can effectively reduce the need for reactive enforcement and align business practices with public expectations. As direct selling continues to evolve, sustained collaboration among industry leaders, regulators, and consumer advocates will be essential to strengthening marketplace trust.

Is Direct Selling Self Regulation Effective?

Dr. Sandy Jap

The direct selling channel seems to be a favored target for Federal Trade Commission (FTC) scrutiny. In 2019, the Direct Selling Self-Regulatory Council (DSSRC) was established by the Direct Selling Association (DSA) in partnership with the BBB National Programs (BBBNP). The mission of the DSSRC is to enhance consumer and regulatory confidence in the advertising and marketing practices of the direct selling channel through independent, third-party review of claims disseminated by or on behalf of direct selling companies. Since its founding in 2019, the job of the DSSRC has been to educate and encourage direct selling companies to follow and comply with ethical sales and advertising practices.

Has this self-regulation effort in the direct selling channel been effective? Industry self-regulation is an important, yet under-studied phenomenon in business of which we know little. And whether self-regulatory organizations are truly successful at curbing marketing misbehavior is an open question that I seek to answer. To this end, we conducted an evaluation of the effectiveness of the DSSRC’s efforts and case outcomes since its inception in 2019 through February 2024. This analysis was based on their internal reports as well as those represented in the BBB and DSSRC database. Here is the evidence, by the numbers. For the full report, please click here.

Self-monitoring reduces inappropriate marketing practices. First and foremost, there is substantial support for the DSSRC’s value in promoting self-regulation and ethical sales and marketing practices in the direct selling channel. Over the five-year period, the DSSRC accomplished the following:

  • The DSSRC addressed more than 3,600 product and income earning claims involving over 236 different direct selling companies. These inquiries involved an almost identical number of DSA member companies and non-DSA member companies, which might suggest a lack of bias towards DSA members in program administration and self-regulatory efforts.
  • The DSSRC brought about a wide range of claim responses from direct selling companies ranging from product and income claim removal and modification, additional disclosures or substantiation to social media posts, changes in company policies, increased monitoring and education, and consultant actions such as the removal/modification of misleading or false claims or termination/suspension.
  • DSSRC inquiries have resulted in over 400 instances of expeditious resolutions, formal administrative closures, additional education, and dialogue, as well as 25 referrals to the FTC.

This leads to the conclusion that the DSSRC’s self-regulation efforts represented a substantial workload that did not land on the FTC’s desk, require an intervention by a state attorney general office or persist unaddressed.

DSA membership matters. DSA members showed clear evidence of better and more compliance with ethical marketing practices than non-DSA members. While the full report details a substantial number of statistically significant differences between the behaviors, claims and investigative outcomes of inquiries brought against DSA member companies and non-DSA member companies, I highlight a few here:

1) DSA member companies (compared to non-DSA member companies) have fewer product and earning inquiries than non-members. Moreover, their DSA member company consultants are more responsive at removing and modifying problematic product and income earning claims.

2) DSA member companies also average fewer problematic product and income earning inquiries than non-member direct selling companies, and when the problematic inquiries arise, they are removed or resolved significantly faster than the problematic inquiries of non-member companies.

Specifically, DSA members average 3.4 product inquiries versus 7.7 for non-DSA members and will remove 87% of those problematic product inquiries versus 69% for non-DSA members. Additionally, DSA members average 6.4 earning inquiries versus 7.4 for non-DSA members and will remove 81% of those problematic earning inquiries versus 67% for non-DSA members.

3) DSA member companies are less likely to require actions to remedy non-compliance and have a greater number of expeditiously resolved inquiries.

4) DSA direct selling companies demonstrate greater compliance with DSSRC final decisions than non-member direct selling companies.

This suggests that DSA membership is very meaningful in terms of encouraging appropriate sales and marketing practices among direct selling companies. This is likely because DSA members adhere to a written Code of Ethics which established industry standards for consumer protection, receive access to additional educational materials, get updates on the “rules of the road,” and the opportunity to engage in and acclimate to supplementary regulatory and compliance dialogue than non-DSA member companies.

Is self-regulation working in the direct selling channel? Absolutely! I find substantial support for the DSSRC’s value in promoting self-regulation and ethical sales and marketing practices in the direct selling channel. Through February 2024, the DSSRC has accomplished the following:

  • The DSSRC has addressed more than 3,600 product and income earning claims in 450 inquiries involving over 236 different direct selling companies. These 450 inquiries involved almost an identical number of DSA member companies and non-DSA member companies.
  • It has brought about a wide range of claim responses ranging from removal and modification, additional disclosures or substantiation to social media posts, changes in company policies, increased monitoring and education and consultant actions such as the removal/modification of false claims or termination/suspension.
  • The DSSRC’s investigations have resulted in over 400 instances of expeditious resolutions or administrative closures, additional education, and dialogue, as well as 25 referrals to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). An administrative closure means that the direct selling company has made a bona-fide, good faith effort to address DSSRC’s concerns (i.e., by removing the claims at issue or showing that they have attempted to contact the individual responsible for the claims to have the claims removed or significantly modified).

How can the direct selling channel continue to build trust? The research highlights potential next steps in self-regulation of the direct selling channel. Along with publishing this report in its communications and on its website, the DSSRC and the direct selling channel should consider the following:

1) Pool this data report with other findings from the academic self-regulation task force and promote a direct selling white paper that assesses self-regulation efforts since the DSSRC was established.

It is critically important that the DSA and the DSSRC continue to publicize and make available aggregate data on the number of cases, companies, and inquiries that are regularly investigated through its self-monitoring efforts. This has been a constant source of criticism from both the FTC and groups such as Truth in Advertising (TINA) at annual DSA compliance and legal events. These statistics should be regularly shared through social media and prominently displayed on the DSSRC and DSA websites.

2) Standardize reporting to the DSSRC. The DSA’s Ethics and Self-Regulation Committee and General Counsel Committee should standardize internal reporting activities to the DSSRC. The goal is annual reporting of aggregate measures of their self-policing activities and enforcement efforts over time.

3) The DSSRC should collect anonymized aggregate data from compliance officers at direct selling companies on the nature, and effectiveness of their company and consultant education efforts.

4) A survey of DSA-member company compliance officers should be conducted to:

a) Measure and validate the perceived value of the DSSRC.

b) Identify additional support needed from the DSSRC in self-regulation efforts and education.

DSA members should continue to work together to learn best practices from each other regarding policy compliance, as well as shaping and developing corporate policies and monitoring encouraging salesforce compliance. Such roundtable groups have been shown to be particularly effective in a wide range of industries and are a useful template that could be fruitfully applied to the direct selling channel as well.

5) The DSSRC would benefit from receiving regular feedback from DSA members on what type of policy information, education content, and other actions that would be of most use to direct selling companies and their employees.

6) Collect data on education efforts and outreach effectiveness. Such data should be regularly collected on how often its education content is being shared or presented to DSA member companies and with which employees. It is not enough for compliance officers and team members to be educated. Company leadership, marketing teams – all direct sales corporate employees – as well as independent sales consultants need to be regularly instructed and informed on appropriate marketing sales practices and product and income earning claims. Moving forward, information on the number, names, and positions of attendees at DSSRC education events should be retained. Efforts should also be made to provide education in a wide range of formats including synchronous and asynchronous media forms, at industry events, in blog forms, and in podcasts.

Importantly, the value of self-regulation is not solely evidenced by casework, but by education regarding appropriate sales and advertising practices, ongoing dialogue with direct selling companies, and program socialization of industry commitment to meaningful and effective self-regulation. Establishing the DSSRC is not enough. Continuing this commitment and building upon it as evidenced by DSA members working together to build consumer and FTC trust, disseminating the quantitative evidence of these efforts, and ongoing education, is the path forward to building and sustaining trust in the direct selling channel.

 

The Self-Regulation Imperative: Effectively Managing Legal & Ethical Risks

By Dr. OC Ferrell and Dr. Linda Ferrell

Industry self-regulation exists when members of an industry, trade association or sector of the economy establish and monitor adherence to legal, ethical and/or other standards (best practices) to reflect effective consumer protection, ethical industry performance and meet public policy requirements. Self-regulation provides a mechanism to respond to legal, regulatory and ethical issues that provide fair competition and enhance the reputation of an industry. Compliance with these standards is not just for industry trade association members, but all participants in the industry or channel. Self-regulation, using third party oversight, facilitates addressing non-compliance of the entire industry by working with government agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (Soft Law Summit: Activating Industry Self-Regulation, 2023). This research provides an overview of the objectives of self-regulation and reviews the activities and components of leading self-regulatory programs to provide a template for evaluating the Direct Selling Self-Regulatory Council (DSSRC), which serves as an industry-wide self-regulation program for the direct selling channel.

Overview of Self-Regulation

There has been a general movement against government-imposed rules globally. The main focus of government deregulation is to promote economic efficiency, competition, and innovation in the business sector. While deregulation initially reduces costs and increases profits for business, critics often claim it can lead to unintended social costs. For example, deregulation in the energy sector has generally led to increased competition, innovation, and market openness, but its short-term effects on lowering electricity prices are inconsistent, and it can expose consumers to higher risks and reduce regulatory protections (Necoechea-Porras, López, & Salazar-Elena, 2021). Politicians, both left and right, globally, have embraced deregulation. The European Commission (EC) pledged to cut reporting requirements by at least 25%, and 35% for small and medium-sized firms. Vietnam is in the process of abolishing 25% of government agencies. In the United States (US), President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order to eliminate 10 regulations for every new regulation added (Economist, Feb 1, 2025. “The War on Red Tape (Rule Breakers)”.

Nowhere has there been a greater reduction in government regulation than in Argentina. The country has taken 800 steps to reduce regulation with more structural reforms to come. Certain imports into Argentina have seen a significant drop in prices as a result of the government’s efforts. These examples illustrate that self-regulation coupled with government deregulation can improve the efficiency of economic systems. Since taking office, Argentine President Javier Milei has issued roughly two deregulation reforms per day on average, including weekends (Vasquez, 2025). As government deregulation continues, industry self-regulation can shift some monitoring and oversight responsibilities to the private sector, including industry trade associations.

Regulation is even more problematic for the small businesses and independent contractors that typically drive market innovation because they often lack the resources to address complicated regulatory rules. Many small businesses say that dealing with regulation hinders growth and takes up too much of their time (Swanek, 2024). Small businesses and new firms are typically most impacted by inefficient regulation (Cordes, Dudley, and Washington, 2022). Additionally, regulation can reduce incentive to innovate. A study of mandatory financial disclosures in Europe found that requiring companies to publish detailed financial reports discourages innovation, particularly among smaller firms, by exposing proprietary information, which reduces their incentives to innovate (Breuer, Leuz, & Vanhaverbeke, 2025).

Complex regulations can stifle flexibility, making it harder for companies to adapt to changing market conditions, distribution methods, technology or consumer behavior. Additionally, rapid changes in technology can make some regulations obsolete. There is no doubt that resources used to monitor, report and comply can increase costs and prices to consumers. It is difficult to eliminate regulations that are obsolete and a cost to society, and the United States seems to fall behind many other developed countries in actively working to cut red tape and speed up regulatory processes (Cordes, Dudley, and Washington, 2022). In addition, regulation can limit consumer and business options and decrease competitiveness. On the other hand, government regulation, such as antitrust laws, are essential for maintaining a level playing field, promoting fair competition and ensuring markets remain competitive (Sokol & Zhou, 2024). Regulations also protect consumers from criminals who engage in fraud and exploitative practices. Some regulations are necessary to protect general public interests, including health and safety, environmental issues, unsafe products and workplace safety. Self-regulatory bodies do not have the authority to enforce laws, regulatory rules or legal actions to stop misconduct in most cases. Self-regulation programs, hand-in-hand with government regulation can work together to promote responsible business conduct.

Industry members committed to ethical and socially responsible conduct have the potential to provide more insights into the efficiencies of practical standards, more than those developed by governments. Government regulation is often developed to restrain a few rogue firms that have engaged in misconduct, but it can result in costly compliance with rules that impede the efficiency and effectiveness of the entire industry. Effective self-regulation with independent third-party oversight can help educate members of an industry about compliance and misconduct as well as educate participants on ethical conduct and best practices. Self-regulation tends to be more effective when outside groups, like industry organizations, independent auditors, nonprofit watchdogs, and government partners, are involved to provide oversight and support (Maman & Feldman, 2025). Firms that refuse to stop engaging in misconduct can be referred to government regulatory agencies such as the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to protect consumers as well as other industry participants. Self-regulation can fill gaps in areas where even the government is limited due to resource shortfalls and the need to focus on the most egregious of cases. This illustrates how self-regulation and government regulation can work together to assure responsible conduct. Effective self-regulation involves monitoring and addressing the conduct of all members of an industry.

The Case for Industry Self-Regulation

Self-regulation has many advantages over government regulation. First, it can educate the industry on standards to prevent and correct misconduct. Self-regulation offers flexibility and allows organizations to respond quickly to evolving practices, including new technology (Platt Majoras, 2025). Gaining cooperation with government agencies and other stakeholders provides a balance of responsibilities and most effectively addresses challenges. All stakeholders gain from the resources an industry invests in self-regulation. The industry benefits through proactive risk management and enhancing its reputation with key stakeholders and government regulators can use their limited resources more effectively.

Self-regulation can take place within individual companies, across entire industries, or within the broader business community as part of the economic system (Hemphill, 1992). Trade association self-regulatory initiatives provide guidance beyond legal requirements. Companies with high ethical standards go beyond legal compliance. These ethical standards and expectations create a buffer zone to prevent employees or representatives from engaging in misconduct. All firms have mandated requirements from laws and regulations. Business ethics programs and industry standards go beyond just compliance with the law. In business, states often have conflicting regulations and specific laws for an industry. Therefore, while these laws and regulations must be obeyed, holding firms to a higher standard can be helpful in avoiding legal issues.

Industry participants develop core practices that account for the legal dimensions while also incorporating self-regulatory standards and addressing the concerns of stakeholders. For example, the BBB National Programs (BBBNP) is an important self-regulatory body that provides directions for managing disputes, and the National Advertising Division (NAD) reviews advertising cases involved in disputes. Core practices in industry self-regulation programs evolve as they gain acceptance and reflect the expectations of key stakeholders. Core practices could also be considered norms that are behavioral expectations not legally required. The US government encourages industries and firms to establish proactive ethical standards that are core practices. Chapter 8 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations requires the board of directors to be responsible for ethics and compliance activities. If misconduct occurs, firms are given incentives, such as reduced penalties, if they can demonstrate an effective ethics and compliance program (United States Sentencing Commission, 2024).

Trade associations play a role in shaping industry-wide corporate social responsibility, especially in highly regulated and scrutinized sectors (Schaefer & Kerrigan, 2008). In addition to setting ethical expectations and advocating on behalf of members, trade associations may also establish voluntary standards or promote practices that go beyond the legal requirement. This includes engaging in philanthropic activities, giving back to communities and supporting employee development and retention through education, training and benefits. When an entire industry faces stronger outside pressure to act responsibly, its trade association is more likely to take an active role in addressing social and ethical concerns (Schaefer & Kerrigan, 2008).

The FTC recognizes the importance of self-regulation in an industry and encourages the adoption of self-regulatory practices (Rosch, 2007). If businesses focus on self-regulation, this allows the government to use its resources on significant competition issues and give best practices advice on issues where the government cannot intervene with its existing resources. The FTC does provide guidance on how businesses can develop effective self-regulatory programs. The FTC also recognizes that business has the necessary hands-on experience that enables it to address many issues more capably than a government agency. Since self-regulation is a quicker, more flexible and less adversarial means to establishing and enforcing standards, the benefits to society are significant. The FTC is very active in assisting and supporting industry self-regulation and establishing standards.

Better Business Bureau and BBB National Programs Leadership in Self-Regulation

One of the most visible and comprehensive industry-level, self-regulatory organization is the Better Business Bureau (BBB), founded in 1912. Through the International Association of BBBs (IABBB), there are more than 180 local offices in the United States, Canada and Mexico. Each bureau, through its offices, provides community oversight for ethical business, but there is limited enforcement of codes and rules. The bureau uses the mass media to warn businesses and consumers of the offending firms. If this firm is a member of the BBB, then membership can be revoked. These programs influence the future of government regulation in a firm’s industry and demonstrates its commitment to being accountable.

By contrast, BBB National Programs is an independent, nonprofit organization with a shared history, but not affiliated with, the International Association of Better Business Bureaus. BBB National Programs, is home to the independent, industry self-regulation programs that were a part of the Council of Better Business Bureaus since the 1970’s.

Industry standards and dispute resolution protect consumers and promote fair competition (BBB National Programs, 2022). These programs not only reduce the need to expand government regulation, but also help firms maintain an ethical interface with their stakeholders. BBB National Programs provides third-party oversight to companies and industries. BBB National Programs has helped many industries develop effective self-regulatory programs. This research overviews the BBB National Programs’ Direct Selling Self-Regulatory Council (DSSRC), focusing on product and earnings claims compared to other industry self-regulation programs.

An example of one of the oldest and most well-known national programs is the National Advertising Division (NAD). While the FTC is in charge of enforcing consumer protection in advertising laws that aim to prevent deception, many of the cases are handled by the NAD. While the NAD operates independently, it takes its cue from the FTC. The FTC could not monitor and enforce advertising deception without the resources of the NAD (Federal Trade Commission, 2009). One reason the FTC supports self-regulation is the number of complaints received each year. In 2024, the FTC received 6.5 million complaints from consumers (Consumer Sentinel Network Data Book, 2024). The most common complaints are related to credit bureaus and information furnishers, identity theft, imposter scams, online shopping and reviews, and banking. It is clear that self-regulation contributes to reducing the FTC involvement in the need for enforcement of laws. Self-regulation can prevent misconduct and gain efficient results with respect to questionable conduct.

Evaluating Self-Regulatory Programs

The FTC prioritizes key elements and characteristics of self-regulatory organizations. These include: the authority to create and enforce its own policies; governance-including independent boards, transparency and a defined process; conflict management to address conflicts of interest with transparent mechanisms for resolution; effective and transparent processes and procedures for oversight and regulating members of the industry; appropriately resourced, technically and advanced surveillance programs; adequately funded enforcement program that polices misconduct; regulatory database of information about outcomes that is accessible to stakeholders; market disruption procedures in case of capacity, continuity or computer failures that impact operations; innovation to stay ahead of the curve; and a dispute resolution process that employee find offers fair and transparent policies and procedures (Evens, 2014).

Each self-regulatory group was evaluated based upon: ethical leadership, independent oversight, clear standards and guidelines, scope and focus of accountability, transparency, education and training and continuous improvement (ongoing risk management). Appendix A provides an overview of each program using this template. The programs evaluated include: Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), Distilled Spirits Council of the U.S. (DISCUS), Direct Selling Self-Regulatory Council (DSSRC), Children’s Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative (CFBAI), Children’s Advertising Review Unit (CARU), National Advertising Division (NAD), Online Behavioral Advertising (OBA) and Online Lenders Alliance (OLA). All of these programs focus on advertising, promotion and communication with key stakeholders.

A review of the DSSRC compared to other self-regulatory programs indicates that all of the components of the DSSRC program reflect BBB National Programs’ best practices and the characteristics of effective regulatory programs. With DSSRC managed by BBB National programs, it provides independent, non-profit oversight of the program. The key features of BBB National Programs are accountability, trust, impartial monitoring, enforcement and dispute resolution (Marinello, 2024).

By working with the DSSRC guidelines, direct selling companies demonstrate their commitment to ethical marketing practices, transparent disclosure of material information and the correct positioning of the direct selling opportunity (Marinello, 2024). The DSSRC is strengthening consumer trust and addressing potential misconduct issues before legal and/or regulatory intervention. This proactive approach not only prevents misconduct in the marketplace, often by non-DSA member firms, but also educates these firms about appropriate conduct in the marketplace. While the FTC and state legislation may develop unpredictable rules and regulations, the DSSRC can provide stability in developing and challenging regulations that can best be addressed by self-regulation.

References

Appendix A
Self-Regulatory Program: Core Elements

Direct Selling Self-Regulatory Council (DSSRC)

Website: https://bbbprograms.org/programs/all-programs/dssrc

Executive Director: Peter Marinello

Ethical Leadership: Peter Marinello is vice president of the BBBNP and serves as the executive director of the DSSRC. He brings a wealth of legal and self-regulatory experience from the National Advertising Division and the Electronic Retailing Self-Regulation Program.

Independent Oversight: BBB National Programs’ oversight, auditing and monitoring of product and earnings claims violations ensures a high level of credibility, expertise and effectiveness in program implementation and integration with legal and regulatory frameworks. DSSRC provides third-party oversight in conjunction with clear principles of business ethics set forth by the Direct Selling Association (DSA).

Clear Standards and Guidelines: Clear industry standards on issues such as product and earning representations (Direct Selling Code of Ethics I DSA Business Standards).

Scope and Focus of Accountability Mechanisms: Monitors the entire direct selling channel and embodies the following:

  • Relevant best practices from other self-regulatory models
  • A process that both monitors and enforces strict business principles; and
  • Guidance to raise the bar of excellence for DSA members and the entire direct selling channel

Transparency:

  • Shares summaries of case outcomes over the years (2019-2024): cases referred to the FTC (non-response and non-compliance); number of public case decisions; unique URLs reviewed to expose non-compliance; specific number of COVID-tagged postings; and number of administratively closed cases.
  • Comprehensive 2024 Activity Report with great detail on information on monitoring, origin of awareness of misconduct, nature of the misconduct (earnings claims vs. product claims), location of claims (social media accounts vs. company websites), etc.
  • Providing Code Administration for the DSA involving complaint handling procedures related to concerns about adherence to the DSA Code of Ethics (including annual Code of Ethics Compliance Reports).

Education and Training:

  • Direct Selling Education Foundation (DSEF) Building Trust in the Marketplace Conference (August 29-30, 2023) brought together direct selling industry business leaders, legal professionals, advertising experts, and salesforce members.
  • DSA Direct Selling Compliance Officers Certification and Handbook helps companies stay compliant by offering certification on compliance, best practices, tips and suggestions for new compliance officers.
  • DSSRC provides Earnings Claims Guidance, Income Disclosure Statement Guidance, and field training for companies seeking to establish or enhance their ethics/compliance programs.

Continuous Improvement and Ongoing Risk Management:

  • Recognition of emerging areas of concern (COVID-19 product claims, as an example).

Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)

Website: https://www.finra.org/

President/CEO: Robert W. Cook

Ethical Leadership: Robert W. Cook served as the Director of the Division of Trading and Markets of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for three years prior to joining FINRA. Mr. Cook earned his JD from Harvard Law School, a Master of Science in Industrial Relations and Personnel Management from the London School of Economics, and an A.B. in Social Studies from Harvard College. Under his leadership, FINRA helps write and enforce rules to foster an environment of market transparency.

Independent Oversight: FINRA works under the direct supervision of the SEC to protect the investing public against fraudulent and unethical practices. The US Congress has granted the SEC authority to ensure the broker-dealer industry and associated regulatory bodies operate fairly and honestly.

Clear Standards and Guidelines: FINRA’s rules and guidelines ensure a safe and fair market. These rules are constantly changing to adapt to new developments in the industry.

Scope and Focus of Accountability Mechanisms: Plays a critical role in ensuring the integrity of America’s financial system by

  • Writing and enforcing rules governing the ethical activities of all registered broker-dealer firms and registered brokers in the US.
  • Examining firms for compliance with rules.
  • Fostering market transparency and educate investors.

Transparency:

  • Shares information regarding individual transactions in active US Treasury securities on a same- day basis for FINRA members and professionals who subscribe to their data product. This information is made publicly available on FINRA’s website for non-commercial use the next day.
  • Offers several reporting tools based on compliance requirements that allow users to report mandatory trades, view display-only quotes and activity, and easily access and reference the Uniform Practice Code to assess operational and settlement issues.

Education and Training:

  • College of Examinations (COE) and College of Risk Monitoring (CORM): Periodic training programs for entry-level employees that include both onsite and virtual training sessions covering various aspects of the industry.
  • Securities Industry Essentials (SIE) Examination: Passing the SIE is a mandatory prerequisite for beginning employment at FINRA. FINRA’s new-hire training involves integration of SIE exam study materials and resources.
  • FINRA Honors Program: A two-year full-time rotational program open to recent law school graduates and attorneys that provide the opportunity to complete sophisticated legal work and protect investors and financial markets.

Continuous Improvement and Ongoing Risk Management:

  • FINRA maintains a dedicated Risk Monitoring Team including executive Risk Monitoring Director and Risk Monitoring Analyst roles to actively maintain communication with firms and provide prompt and accurate answers to their regulatory concerns.

Distilled Spirits Council of the U.S. (DISCUS)

Website: https://www.distilledspirits.org/

President/CEO: Chris R. Swonger

Ethical Leadership: Chris Swonger is President and CEO of DISCUS and Responsibility.org, a non-profit organization that has raised over $250 million from leading distillers to fight driving under the influence and underage drinking. With over 25 years of experience in the public and private sector, representing elected officials and three diverse, global consumer goods companies, Chris has led integrated corporate affairs strategies with responsibility for public affairs, international government affairs, corporate reputation management, corporate communications, brand public relations, philanthropy, and social responsibility. Upon taking over DISCUS he declared his focus on breaking down the traditional barriers that often separate corporations, non-government organizations, and activist groups.

Independent Oversight: Two critical bodies of experienced professionals, the Code Review Board and Outside Advisory Board, serve to execute and ensure adherence to the Code. For several decades, the Code Review Board has served to evaluate complaints and inquiries about advertising and marketing materials subject to this Code. The Code Review Board complaint process is transparent, and the resulting decisions and actions are regularly published on the DISCUS website. The Outside Advisory Board is composed of highly esteemed professionals with extensive experience related to responsible advertising. The Advisory Board is available to provide anonymous guidance on Code compliance, as well as their opinion if the Code Review Board cannot arrive at a majority decision on a complaint.

Clear Standards and Guidelines: Code of Responsible Practices used as a model of self-regulation, providing rigorous yet fair standards.

Scope and Focus of Accountability Mechanisms: DISCUS code applies to all activities in the United States undertaken to advertise and market distilled spirits, including beer and wine brands marketed by both DISCUS members and non-members. DISCUS regulates the responsible placement and content of beverage alcohol advertising materials and provides detailed guidelines to encourage safe and responsible consumption. DISCUS is more rigorous than the First Amendment has a transparent and accountable process covering the full breadth of advertising and marketing practices.

Transparency:

  • Code Review Board takes complaints and provides decisions and reasoning on certain beverage- marketing issues. These resulting decisions and any further actions are regularly published on the DISCUS website for public access.
  • Companies should provide a copy of their code of ethics to advertising agencies, media buyers, and other external consultants involved in a member’s advertising or marketing activities

Education and Training: DISCUS partners with several esteemed course providers to educate employees and non-employees alike on suitable beverage advertising practices. These courses include Level 1 and Level 2 Awards in Spirits, which focuses on the history of spirits, their significance in the U.S. economy, and the applicable regulations and laws surrounding their advertisement.

Continuous Improvement and Ongoing Risk Management: The DISCUS Safety and Risk Management Committee is made up of industry experts from DISCUS member companies and is responsible for evaluating and proactively engaging applicable regulatory agencies, insurance companies, and other standards. The committee keeps up to date with technological developments and legal proceedings to ensure an atmosphere of ongoing risk management throughout the industry.

The Children’s Food & Beverage Advertising Initiative (CFBAI)

Website: https://bbbprograms.org/programs/all-programs/cfbai

President/CEO: Eric D. Reicin

Ethical Leadership: Eric D. Reicin has served as Vice President, General Counsel, and Corporate Secretary for MorganFranklin Consulting LLC, a management consulting and government contracting firm. Since 2019 he has served as BBB National Programs’ President and CEO, where he leads the organization in fostering an environment of trust, innovation and competition.

Independent Oversight: The Children’s Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative is overseen by BBB National Programs, which also administers the Children’s Advertising Review Unit (CARU). BBB National Programs provides oversight ensuring that participants commit that advertising primarily to children under age 13 in the US will meet certain nutrition criteria.

Clear Standards and Guidelines:

  • Clear guidelines on what company-specific nutrition criteria may be advertised to children under 13.
  • Core Principles regarding requirements of food advertising to children for advertising and elementary school participants.

Scope and Focus of Accountability Mechanisms: CFBAI monitors the broad industry of child-directed food advertising expenditures in the US and most of the food advertising on children’s TV programming. CFBAI monitors and evaluates the participants’ compliance with their pledge commitments, and companies also submit annual self-assessments. Participants represent the majority of child-directed food advertising expenditures in the US and most of the food advertising on children’s TV programs.

Transparency:

  • All participants must comply with CFBAI’s Core Principles and must submit nutritional information regarding foods to be advertised to children. CFBAI’s website is regularly updated with a product list that reflects these foods.
  • The program requires participants to submit detailed self-assessments annually to easily and efficiently address non-compliance and disagreements between CFBAI and participants.
  • CFBAI regularly publishes annual reports discussing participants’ complaints and progress.
  • CFBAI accepts complaints on their website although these complaints are rare.

Education and Training: Periodic required training of employees across multiple divisions which might include nutrition, legal, marketing, policy and planning, product development, etc.

Continuous Improvement and Ongoing Risk Management: CFBAI regularly reviews the Uniform Nutrition Criteria to ensure it reflects the most current nutrition science and government guidance. The organization often references and directly communicates with the FDA to determine nutrition guidelines and compliance.

The Children’s Advertising Review Unit (CARU)

Executive Director: Eric D. Reicin

Ethical Leadership: Eric D. Reicin has served as Vice President, General Counsel, and Corporate Secretary for MorganFranklin Consulting LLC, a management consulting and government contracting firm. Since 2019 he has served as BBB National Programs’ President and CEO, where he leads the organization in fostering an environment of trust, innovation and competition.

Independent Oversight: The Children’s Advertising Review Unit is overseen by BBB National Programs, which also administers the Children’s Food & Beverage Advertising Initiative (CFBAI). BBB National Programs provides oversight ensuring that participants commit that advertising primarily to children under age 13 in the US will meet certain nutrition criteria. This self-regulatory body is voluntarily supported by brands such as Coca-Cola, Disney, McDonald’s, General Mills, Google, and others.

Clear Standards and Guidelines:

  • CARU Advertising Guidelines – monitors child-directed media to ensure compliance with these guidelines, seeking voluntary cooperation of companies and referral for enforcement action to authorities, such as the FTC or state attorneys general.
  • CARU Privacy Guidelines – address those concerns by providing guidance on specific issues involving online data collection and other privacy-related practices by operators of a website known to be collecting data on children under 13 years of age.

Scope and Focus of Accountability Mechanisms: Monitors all advertisers or websites that may deal with data collection from those aged 13 years or younger. The goal is for these companies to understand the implications of their advertising, as well as the effects and deceptiveness of advertising on children. Participants who have complaints filed against them are accountable to larger regulatory bodies.

Transparency:

  • Voluntary participants must comply with CARU’s core principles of the role of advertisers and data collection to not abuse the impact it has on children.
  • CARU makes the distinguishment between content and advertising is for children.
  • CARU releases an annual press release detailing best practices, compliance with laws, and responsibility for these advertisers that target children.

Education and Training:

  • CARU hosts various events annually encouraging those participating to come learn about updates and recent findings and best practices.
  • On their website, there are multiple resources available to CARU members such as archives and services provided.
  • CARU supporters also have access to CARU experts for questions, pre-screening and guidance from staff, and invitations to the annual supporters’ council meeting.

Continuous Improvement and Ongoing Risk Management:

  • CARU provides updates and news articles with recent developments in this spaces.
  • Pre-screening allows advertisers to have their practices checked out by CARU staff for best practices and compliance.

National Advertising Division (NAD)

Executive Director: Eric D. Reicin

Ethical Leadership: Eric D. Reicin has served as Vice President, General Counsel, and Corporate Secretary for MorganFranklin Consulting LLC, a management consulting and government contracting firm. Since 2019 he has served as BBB National Programs’ President and CEO, where he leads the organization in fostering an environment of trust, innovation and competition.

Independent Oversight: The National Advertising Division is overseen by BBB National Programs, which also administers the Children’s Food & Beverage Advertising Initiative (CFBAI) and Children’s Advertising Review Unit (CARU). BBB National Programs provides oversight ensuring that participants commit that advertising primarily to children under age 13 in the US will meet certain nutrition criteria. This self-regulatory body is voluntarily supported by brands such as Coca-Cola, Disney, McDonald’s, General Mills, Google, and others.

Clear Standards and Guidelines:

  • Clear policies and procedures are provided to understand the definitions, proceedings, and guidance relating to the NAD.
  • See 2024 Annual Report
  • If an advertiser wants to appeal their case, it will be reviewed by the National Advertising Review Board (NARB).

Scope and Focus of Accountability Mechanisms: The goal of the NAD is to help regulate advertising to be truthful and accurate for consumers with claims in national advertising. Its monitoring efforts are governed by its procedures and policies in place, and its resolution letters from disputes with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) are listed publicly to ensure consumers are aware of such discrepancies.

Transparency:

  • All resolution letters from the FTC are listed publicly on their website.
  • It is known and made aware that the entire NAD is voluntary, and the annual reports list details of recent developments and case trends & statistics.

Education and Training:

  • There are annual meetings with the NAD with special speakers featuring companies and advertisers with personal testimony of changes in the industry.
  • There is an executive summary in the annual report, detailing stats of various cases and how often there are referrals in the industry about certain types of advertising.

Continuous Improvement and Ongoing Risk Management:

  • These highlights and annual reports provide for monitoring and updates regarding advertising for the NAD and changes to the industry.
  • If there are issues brought about from cases and the advertiser complies with recommended changes, the case is closed. If there are discrepancies noted, and the advertiser does not wish to make changes, then it is referred to the FTC or other regulatory bodies

Online Behavioral Advertising (OBA)

Website: https://www.iab.com/news/self-regulation-2/

Executive Director/Leadership:

  • Association of National Advertisers (ANA)
    Bob Liodice
  • American Association of Advertising Agencies (AAAA)
    Marla Kaplowitz
  • American Advertising Federation (AAF)
    Steve Pacheco
  • Direct Marketing Association (DMA)
    Lawrence M. Kimmel
  • Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB)
    David Cohen

Independent Oversight: The United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC) closely monitors and provides independent oversight of behavioral targeting techniques used by online advertisers. They hold consistent workshops and publish periodic reports and articles on OBA.

Clear Standards and Guidelines: Cross-industry guidelines for applying consumer-friendly standards to online behavioral advertising across the internet.

Scope and Focus of Accountability Mechanisms:

  • The principles apply to numerous diverse entities that work to deliver relevant advertising intended to enrich the online consumer experience.
  • Online behavioral advertising (OBA) consists of “any collection of data online from a particular computer or device regarding web viewing behaviors over time and across non-affiliate websites for the purpose of using such data to predict user preferences or interests to deliver advertising to that device.”
  • Principles do not apply to websites’ collection of viewing behavior solely for its own uses.

Transparency: “The Transparency Principle requires the deployment of multiple mechanisms for clearly disclosing and informing consumers about data collection and use practices associated with online behavioral advertising. This Principle applies to entities collecting and using data for online behavioral advertising and to the websites from which such data is being collected and used by third parties. Compliance with this Principle will result in new links and disclosures on the web page or advertisement where online behavioral advertising occurs.”

Education and Training: “The Education Principle calls for entities to participate in efforts to educate consumers and businesses about online behavioral advertising. It is expected that there will be a robust industry-developed website(s) that provide consumers with educational material about online behavioral advertising. Additionally, it will result in numerous online impressions educating the public about how online behavioral advertising works and the choices that are available to consumers.”

It’s worth noting that there is no one particular education program entities require their employees to undergo, and these education efforts vary from company to company.

Continuous Improvement and Ongoing Risk Management: Programs systematically and/or randomly monitor the internet for compliance with the Principles. There is a process in place for taking and addressing complaints from the public, from competitors, and from government agencies concerning possible non-compliance. When an entity is informed regarding its non-compliance they are required to send public reports of corrections and uncorrected violations to appropriate legal entities.

Online Lenders Alliance (OLA)

President/CEO: Andrew Duke

Website: https://onlinelendersalliance.org/

Ethical Leadership: With 27 years in public policy, Andrew Duke brings extensive experience to OLA. He spent two decades on Capitol Hill, including as Chief of Staff for three members of Congress, notably Chairman Jeb Hensarling. He also led the Consumer Education Division at the CFPB. As OLA’s leader, Andrew oversees a diverse membership of job creators, lenders, fraud experts, privacy advocates, and more. He is dedicated to educating the public, media, and policymakers on the benefits of safe, regulated access to credit through online lending innovations.

Independent Oversight: The OLA is a self-regulatory trade association, so it is not directly supervised by a single government agency. Instead, it operates under its own governance and oversight, providing resources and setting standards for online lenders. However, the OLA works closely with various regulatory bodies that oversee aspects of online lending and financial services, including the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).

Clear Standards and Guidelines:

  • OLA’s federal policy team advocates for members and the industry by engaging with policymakers, sharing industry insights, submitting comments, and participating in meetings with key groups and coalitions to strengthen advocacy efforts.
  • OLA Policy Resources

Scope and Focus of Accountability Mechanisms: The OLA plays a crucial role in maintaining the integrity of the online lending industry by:

  • Developing and promoting best practices and standards for responsible online lending.
  • Advocating for fair, transparent, and responsible lending practices that protect consumers and businesses.
  • Collaborating with policymakers and regulators to ensure a balanced regulatory environment.
  • Educating stakeholders, including lawmakers and the public, on the benefits of safe, regulated access to credit through online lending platforms.

Transparency:

  • Provides detailed information on online lending practices, including loan performance, compliance with industry standards, and best practices, available to OLA members and stakeholders.
  • Shares relevant data and insights on regulatory updates, industry trends, and member activities through OLA’s website and newsletters to promote transparency and industry knowledge.

Education and Training:

  • OLA Training Programs: Periodic training sessions for industry professionals, offering both in-person and virtual courses on best practices, compliance, and key topics related to online lending.
  • Online Lending Essentials (OLE) Certification: A required certification for new employees in the online lending space, integrating foundational knowledge and industry standards to ensure responsible lending practices.
  • OLA Leadership Program: A rotational program for emerging leaders in the industry, providing hands-on experience and training in regulatory compliance, legal issues, and innovations in online lending.

Continuous Improvement and Ongoing Risk Management: OLA maintains a dedicated Risk Management Team to support members with real-time regulatory updates, compliance resources, and best practices to mitigate risks and enhance industry standards.

Breaking Down The FTC’s Updated Business Guidance Concerning Multi-Level Marketing and Income Disclosure Statements

By Branko Jovanovic and Monica Zhong[1]

Ensuring that direct sellers’ Income Disclosure Statement (“IDS”) reliably and accurately reflects the actual experience of a typical distributor has long been the FTC’s requirement. On April 30, 2024, the FTC published updated Business Guidance Concerning Multi-Level Marketing (“2024 Guidance”)[2] that details the current principles and practices that the FTC considers in its assessment of whether an MLM is offering an unlawful compensation structure and operating as a pyramid scheme. While the FTC continues to emphasize that representations about income opportunities should reflect the earnings of a typical distributor[3] and that any income claims must be based on reliable empirical evidence,[4] the 2024 Guidance outlines a number of requirements regarding what constitutes deceptive earnings.

Following the release of the 2024 Guidance, on September 4, 2024 the FTC published a staff report titled “Multi-Level Marketing Income Disclosure Statements” (“Staff Report”).[5] The Staff Report “documents an analysis of 70 publicly available income disclosure statements from a wide range of MLMs”[6] and shows that many of the reviewed income disclosure statements: “(a) present income data that does not take account of participants who made little or no income, often without clearly explaining the limitation; (b) do not account for expenses incurred by participants, often without clearly stating the limitation; (c) emphasize high dollar amounts received by a relatively small number of participants; (d) do not include information about the limited income that most participants receive, or provide this information only inconspicuously; and (e) use terms and present income data in potentially confusing or ambiguous ways.”[7]

In this paper we discuss, from an economic standpoint, several ways for MLMs to adapt their income and earnings reports (which are typically in the form of IDSs) to be better aligned with the 2024 Guidance and to alleviate some of the criticism levied in the Staff Report. While these adaptations generally require direct sellers to adopt conservative measures of participants’ earnings and treat the IDS as a risk management tool, we are cognizant of a potential tension between this approach and the IDS as a marketing tool meant to attract potential participants.

Defining “I” in the IDS

The Staff Report notes that “none of the reviewed income disclosure statements clearly explains what data is being presented to consumers. They prominently state that they are sharing information about ‘income’ and ‘earnings,’ but do not conspicuously explain what the terms mean.”[8] Furthermore, the Staff Report states that “nearly every disclosure statement uses prominent headings that describe the data provided as ‘income’ or ‘earnings’ without further qualification” and that “terms such as ‘earnings’ can mean different things in different contexts.”[9]

As recognized in the Staff Report, the IDS generally captures the amount of money the direct seller paid to participants, including commissions, bonuses, overrides, and awards.[10] While retail sales are recognized as a potentially significant source of earnings for distributors, the IDSs typically do not report retail profits because direct sellers usually do not track distributors’ sales to final customers.[11] Including these retail profits in the IDS would not only improve the document’s accuracy but could also potentially make the IDS more attractive to potential participants.

Capturing Participants’ Costs

Perhaps the most important requirement that the 2024 Guidance repeatedly insists upon is that “claims about earnings should take into account both what participants earn and what they spend.”[12] In particular, expenses, such as costs for product purchases, travel for conferences, tools or services, and training, must be subtracted from any revenue earned to determine whether the participant has made a profit or lost money.[13]

While the FTC insists that the IDS ought to account for all costs incurred by individuals pursuing the business, currently, IDSs generally do not disclose or quantify business expenses incurred by the typical distributor that reduce their net earnings.[14] These expenses fall into two broad categories: those observable in the companies’ business intelligence (distributor-level) data, and those that are generally unobservable.

The observable expenses include direct expenses (fees for registration and renewal, fees for distributor websites, marketing and sales aids, etc.) and expenses associated with enrollment and rank/eligibility maintenance. Direct expenses can generally be assessed using company-wide data and/or the data on distributor-level purchases (often referred to as order-line data).[15] Some typical and recurring expenses, such as general enrollment costs and costs to attend mandatory training or conferences, can be inferred from company-wide data. However, this data usually cannot capture the disparity in costs incurred by individual participants, as some may meet different enrollment requirements. The order-line data on the other hand, can track participant-specific expenses associated with enrollment (including starter kits and any administrative fees) and eligibility maintenance (minimum purchase requirements). While these costs are relatively easy to identify in the data, their treatment is less clear because they generally provide the purchaser with some consumption value and incorporating them into the IDS could overstate distributors’ expenses.

Unobservable, distributor-specific expenses can include the cost of setting up and maintaining the business, as well as the cost of travel to conventions and other events. While business intelligence and order-line data provide little information on these expenses, a well-designed and executed survey could shed some light on these costs.

Challenges Associated with Reporting Typical Earnings: Projections and Extrapolation

The 2024 Guidance explicitly states that “[t]he IDS should not misrepresent participant earnings, including by annualizing or projecting income that was not actually earned by a participant in the time period the IDS covers.”[16] This requirement addresses the treatment of distributors who did not participate throughout the period covered by the IDS.

To understand this requirement, consider a simple example: A distributor joined a direct selling company in June and earned $25 in November and $75 in December for a total of $100. Annualizing this distributor’s earnings (i.e., stating that this distributor would have earned $1,200), or using the distributor’s average monthly earnings ($50) to impute this distributor’s earnings for each month of the period covered by the IDS would likely be seen as deceptive by the FTC.[17]

Consider also a scenario where distributor A earns $50 each month for the first six months and nothing afterward, and distributor B earns $50 each month for the last six months, and nothing in the first six months. If the average monthly earnings are calculated ignoring the zero-earning months, the average monthly earnings would be $50 for each month, and the annual average earning would be $600 (the sum of the average monthly earnings). Essentially, the average monthly earnings would be extrapolated for the months where distributors A and B had no earnings, leading to a 100% overstatement of the annual average earnings.[18]

Challenges Associated with Reporting Typical Earnings: Exclusion of Certain Categories of Participants

The Staff Report states that “most of the income disclosure statements reviewed do not depict the distribution of income across all participants, but instead present a distribution that excludes certain groups of participants.”[19] The exclusion of certain categories of participants when reporting typical earnings is a common practice among direct selling companies and is not necessarily a form of deception; every direct selling company has some participants who merely signed up to receive a discount on the company’s products and have no interest in selling the company’s products or building a business. These participants are often merely end-user consumers, who will earn little to no income from the company; including these participants in the earnings report deflates the typical earnings across all distributors.[20]

However, excluding such distributors risks allegations that the IDS artificially inflates earnings by including only those distributors who have achieved some degree of success.[21] Indeed, the 2024 Guidance explicitly states that “excluding the participants who lost money or earned no money, who failed to qualify for bonuses or commissions, or who are considered ‘inactive’ because they didn’t get any compensation or qualify for a certain type of compensation during a particular time period, is misleading.”[22]

To illustrate the effect of exclusion of certain categories of participants when reporting typical earnings, consider the following example: A distributor purchases every month, meets the minimum purchase requirement in 10 months, and earns in three months only. The FTC would likely find that the IDS that calculates this distributor’s earning over either 10 months in which the minimum purchase requirement was met, or three months when this distributor earned as an active distributor (those who by definition of the compensation plan are eligible to receive earnings) is deceptive.

Characterizing Distributor Earnings

The 2024 Guidance states that if “the MLM or participant does not have a reasonable basis to know what the typical person in the group is likely to achieve in earnings, they should not make any earnings claims, including lifestyle claims.”[23] In particular, the FTC states that “if they are atypical, then discussion of those atypical earnings must be accompanied, at a minimum, by a clear, prominent, and unavoidable presentation of the typical participant’s revenue and expenses.”[24]

Further, the FTC also explicitly states that in order to make any claim of “modest or supplemental income,” the MLM needs to obtain information on the typical net earnings of participants and establish the exact definition of what “modest and supplemental income” represent to consumers.[25] In essence, this requirement seems to ask that a direct seller conducts an annual survey that would establish the participants’ perception of the terms “modest” and “supplemental” income. However, given the FTC’s general skepticism of survey evidence, it is unclear what type of analysis would be considered sufficient to establish the meaning of these two terms.

Measuring the Typical Distributor’s Earnings

While the 2024 Guidance does not specify the correct metric for measuring the typical distributor’s earnings, the Staff Report appears to endorse the use of “median reported income,”[26] the value separating the higher half from the lower half of distributors in terms of their earnings. As there may be wide variation in how much distributors earn within a rank, simply calculating the arithmetic mean tells potential distributors little about how much a typical distributor at that rank earned.[27] Therefore, applying the median may more accurately capture the typical distributor’s earnings and is less sensitive to extreme values.[28]

Although the earnings and the rank of a single distributor may change dramatically within the period covered by the IDS, parsing their experience by rank and ignoring their overall experience during the relevant period may not speak to the experience of a typical distributor. The Staff Report is critical of such parsing and appears to endorse an alternative approach where the experience of distributors who may have held different ranks during the relevant period may be better captured by reporting the median earnings by the highest rank they achieved in that period.[29]

Presentation of Information Should Not Give Misleading Impressions

The Staff Report suggests that earnings metrics presented in a way that appears to highlight the experience of a small percentage of distributors who achieve high earnings and downplays the experience of a large percentage of distributors who earn relatively modest amounts, if anything at all, will be considered misleading.[30] The Staff Report noted that nearly all of the reviewed IDSs devote most of the visual space in the tables to high income earned by the very small number of participants in the higher ranks or specific percentages of participants at the top of the income scale.[31] This implies that for direct selling companies that feature a relatively high number of unique ranks, the income disclosure tables may be more susceptible to FTC allegations of emphasizing a small number of participants with high income.[32]

The Staff Report also critiques that reference and display of important income information in many reviewed IDSs are in a “less prominent or conspicuous manner.”[33] While the Staff Report points to the use of “prominent unqualified headings” and “less prominent” disclaimers (in fact, the word “prominent” is used on nearly all pages of the report),[34] the report is unclear as to the exact standards the FTC uses to determine whether the display feature is more or less “prominent” in the context of IDSs. However, the Staff Report seems to suggest that actions such as listing out income information as additional rows in the income distribution table and displaying all information in “proximate, equally-prominent text” is considered as prominent disclosure.[35]

Conclusion

Given the complexity associated with preparing an IDS that would meet the FTC’s requirement, direct sellers may wonder whether to publish the IDS at all. After all, the FTC states that “if an MLM is not a ‘Business Opportunity,’[36] it is not required to give any information about earnings to potential participants, but any earnings information it does give must be truthful, substantiated, and non-misleading.”[37] However, if direct sellers opt not to publish an IDS, their distributors cannot make any earnings claims at all—no matter how truthful. Companies must balance the reality that distributors demand and need a voice to speak about their actual experience with the business and the need to create a truthful and accurate IDS.

While IDSs are intended to be an accurate estimate of the earnings participants can generally expect by engaging with the MLM’s business, we note that there is no disclosure “preferred for all consumers,”[38] and that each individual company’s unique compensation structure will be reflected in its IDS.

[1] Branko Jovanovic is a partner and Monica Zhong is a principal consultant at Edgeworth Economics. The opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of their employer and its clients. This article is for general information purposes and is not intended to be and should not be taken as legal advice.

[2] FTC, “Business Guidance Concerning Multi-Level Marketing,” April 30, 2024, available at https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/resources/business-guidance-concerning-multi-level-marketing.

[3] See the 2024 Guidance, question 13: “Any earnings claim should reflect what the typical person to whom the representation is directed is likely to achieve in income, profit, or appreciation.”

[4] See the 2024 Guidance, question 13: “An MLM or participant making claims about MLM income must have a reasonable basis for the claims disseminated to current or prospective participants about the business opportunity at the time it makes the claims. A ‘reasonable basis’ means reliable, empirical evidence that supports the claim, not subjective beliefs or personal anecdotes.”

[5] FTC, “Multi-Level marketing Income Disclosure Statements,” September 4, 2024, available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/mlm-ids-report.pdf.

[6] Karen Hobbs, “FTC staff report analyzes 70 MLM income disclosure statements,” September 4, 2024, available at https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/blog/2024/09/ftc-staff-report-analyzes-70-mlm-income-disclosure-statements?utm_source=govdelivery.

[7] Staff Report, p. 28.

[8] Staff Report, p. i and footnote 8.

[9] Staff Report, p. 19.

[10] Staff Report, footnote 8.

[11] The Staff Report notes that “14 of the 70 income disclosure statements include a disclosure that the amounts represented do not include retail income—that is, when a participant purchases a product from the MLM at a discount and then resells it (presumably at a higher price). Most of the disclosure statements give no indication that such a revenue source has been omitted, and a few expressly state that they include retail income.” Staff Report, p. 19.

[12] The 2024 Guidance, question 13. The Guidance further states that for any direct sellers deciding to publish an IDS, either because they elect to do so or because they offer a “Business Opportunity,” the income and earnings information these direct sellers disclose to current or prospective participants should truthfully consider both participants’ income and typical expenses. See the 2024 Guidance, question 24.

[13] See the 2024 Guidance, question 13. Note that the FTC’s response to question 14 states that “[i]f an MLM or MLM participant does not have access to data showing what participants typically spend pursuing the business opportunity (e.g., product or service purchases, website fees, party costs, and training or conference expenses), they should refrain from making any earnings claims.” In response to question 23, the FTC states that “[i]f an MLM does not have evidence of the typical earnings of its participants (including any costs that its typical participants incur), it should refrain from making any earnings claims and ensure its participants do the same.” The Staff Report notes that “none of the 70 income disclosure statements reviewed provides income figures that take into account all expenses.” Staff Report, p. 12.

[14] Note that Noland Court observed that “[a]ffiliate witnesses did not carefully track (and, in some instances, did not even understand the difference between) revenues and profits.” Order In Re Federal Trade Commission v. James D. Noland, Jr. et al., In the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, May 23, 2023, 17:26–18:1.

[15] Even the observable expenses can be challenging to assess, especially in instances where the expenses are not readily identifiable. For example, the assessment of costs associated with sales aids may require a thorough review of product description and associated price and volume points.

[16] The 2024 Guidance, question 24. Curiously, the Staff Report reports that “[o]ne disclosure statement has a table that lists both average monthly pay and average annual pay—but the annual pay is not 12 times the monthly pay, and the table does not explain how the MLM calculated the figure” in the section titled “Unexplained Discrepancies” (Staff Report, p. 20). But this “discrepancy” simply means that monthly earnings were not annualized, recognizing that some participants enrolled in the year covered by the IDS, and that many do not earn in every month.

[17] The FTC provided the following example: “According to the complaint, when calculating a participant’s annual income, if a participant worked one year — 24 pay periods — but only earned one paycheck for $100, AdvoCare multiplied the single $100 check by 24 pay periods to calculate the participant’s ‘annual average income’ as $2,400. The FTC alleged that AdvoCare’s IDS, therefore, was deceptive in its portrayal of participant income.” The 2024 Guidance, question 24.

[18] The risk of misrepresenting the earnings of the distributors in the two scenarios above would likely be minimized by reporting monthly, instead of annual, earnings.

[19] Staff Report, p. 10.

[20] The Staff Report notes that “[t]he nature of this exclusion varies, but in at least some cases it excludes all participants who received no income as well as potentially others.” Staff Report, p. 10. The Staff Report further states that “[m]ost of the income disclosure statements do not include a prominent, express explanation of the limited nature of the income distribution depicted.” Staff Report, p. 12.

[21] A robust preferred customer program that provides appropriate incentives for individuals to self-classify upon registration gives companies a principled and defensible way to exclude from their IDS individuals who have no desire to participate in the compensation plan.

[22] The 2024 Guidance, question 24. In addition, “participants should not be omitted from earnings statistics unless the MLM has evidence that they have affirmatively opted out of the income-earning opportunity, not merely failed to qualify for it or not merely exercised any inventory buy-back program.” See the 2024 Guidance, question 24.

[23] The 2024 Guidance, question 18. The FTC repeatedly emphasizes the differentiation between typical and atypical earnings and considers it potentially deceptive if the earnings claims do not “reflect what the typical person to whom the representation is directed is likely to achieve,” including the disclaimers that “results are not guaranteed” or similar statements. See the 2024 Guidance, questions 13 and 18.

[24] The 2024 Guidance, question 18.

[25] The 2024 Guidance, question 19.

[26] Staff Report, p. 17 and footnotes 39 and 40.

[27] The Staff Report correctly notes that “while an average can be a useful summary of data that has a relatively small degree of internal variation, it can be misleading when the data is largely consistent but has a small number of outliers.” Staff Report, p. 16.

[28] Consider, for example, a situation where nine distributors earn nothing and one distributor earns $110. The arithmetic mean in this example is $11, which overstates the earnings of all but one distributor. The median equals zero, which more accurately reflects the experience of the majority of participants.

[29] Staff Report, pp. 18–19.

[30] Staff Report, p. 13.

[31] Staff Report, pp. 13–16.

[32] By reducing the number of ranks defined for high-performing participants, direct selling companies can not only potentially alleviate the risk of this criticism, but also simplify their compensation plans.

[33] Staff Report, p. 20.

[34] Staff Report, pp. i, 4, 7–11, 12, 16, 19–21, 23, 29.

[35] Staff Report, p. 21, footnote 22.

[36] Business opportunity, as defined by the Business Opportunity Rule (https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-16/chapter-I/subchapter-D/part-437), means a commercial arrangement in which:

A seller solicits a prospective purchaser to enter into a new business; and

The prospective purchaser makes a required payment; and

The seller, expressly or by implication, orally or in writing, represents that the seller or one or more designated persons will:

Provide locations for the use or operation of equipment, displays, vending machines, or similar devices, owned, leased, controlled, or paid for by the purchaser; or

Provide outlets, accounts, or customers, including, but not limited to, Internet outlets, accounts, or customers, for the purchaser’s goods or services; or

Buy back any or all of the goods or services that the purchaser makes, produces, fabricates, grows, breeds, modifies, or provides, including but not limited to providing payment for such services as, for example, stuffing envelopes from the purchaser’s home.

[37]  The 2024 Guidance, question 23.

[38] See Miller, A. M., Snyder, S., Bosley, S. A., & Greenman, S. (2023). Income disclosure and consumer judgment in a multilevel marketing experiment. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 57(1), 92–120, at p. 95. See also Bosley, S. A., Greenman, S., & Snyder, S. (2020). Voluntary Disclosure and Earnings Expectations in Multi-Level Marketing. Economic Inquiry, 58(4), 1643–1662.

Consumer Protection Against Pyramid Schemes

By JDSR Staff

Concern about pyramid schemes is rightly focused on the victimization of consumers. It is also important to recognize that pyramid schemes damage legitimate businesses, which further harms consumers.

Pyramid fraud works like the classic chain letter scheme where an individual is asked to send money to the sender of a letter, and then forwards the letter to others asking for money from them. The scheme eventually collapses when the last recipient of the letter cannot find new recipients willing to send him or her their money.

So, too, with pyramid schemes, are financial transactions not based on the transfer of goods and services of commensurate value, but rather mostly or exclusively on recruiting members into the scheme. Not only do they facilitate the transfer of wealth from one person to another without the consumption of products, and ultimately collapse when no other willing recruits can be found, they create nothing of social value in the process. Worse, they can injure retail enterprises that do not operate in traditional brick-and-mortar stores by undermining consumer confidence in their legitimacy.

The retail channel most vulnerable to consumer doubts sown by pyramid frauds is direct selling. Direct selling is a decentralized form of retail selling in which companies engage a salesforce of independent contractors to sell their good and services to customers they locate, usually in person and sometimes in the customer’s home.

Part of direct selling’s appeal to the parent company are the lower overhead costs of the operation, bypassing, as it does, the costs of shelf space and advertising to compete with established brands, and the expense of employing a salesforce rather than contracting with independent salespeople, who decide for themselves the extent to which they are willing to be involved in the enterprise.

That flexibility is, along with the low start-up costs involved, the main appeal of the enterprise to most independent direct sellers, who are, in effect, running their own small businesses according to a business plan and schedule they designed in accordance with their financial, social and family needs. Most direct sellers work part time to supplement their families’ incomes modestly.

There are direct sellers who aspire to build bigger businesses by recruiting a network of salespeople and share a percentage of their sales, what’s known as multilevel marketing. Lastly, there are individuals who are involved in direct selling solely or mostly because they enjoy the product and want to purchase it at a discounted price for themselves or their family and friends.

Internal consumption is a perfectly reasonable purpose for involvement in direct selling and constitutes a legitimate sale, no different in kind than a salesperson in a brick-and-mortar store who enjoys the products she sells and uses her employee discount to purchase them.

What distinguishes pyramid schemes from legitimate retail enterprises, including direct selling, is how compensation is earned. Compensation in pyramid fraud is mostly or exclusively earned by recruiting others to the scheme. Direct selling compensates distributors for sales of a good or service to ultimate users, who can be the distributors themselves as long as they are actually using the product. Direct selling companies allow unsold inventory to be returned to the parent company for a 90% or more refund.

Internal consumption is recognized as a valid retail sale in state and federal case law, particularly Federal Trade Commission v. BurnLounge (2014). It is exempted from proscribed activities in model anti-pyramid scheme laws in eighteen states, which were based on the recommendations of the Council of State Governments.

Editor’s note: Read full study by Dr. Chetan Sanghvi and his colleagues at NERA Economic Consulting: “An Economic Analysis of the Criteria Used to Distinguish Legitimate Direct Sellers from Pyramid Schemes,” an insightfully relevant study for policymakers today as they seek to protect consumers and legitimate businesses from bad actors masquerading as direct sellers.

Direct Selling Under Scrutiny: Separating Fact from Fiction

High-level academic task force rebuts myths and misinformation about direct selling channel.

By Dr. Patrick Brockett, Dr. Anne C. Coughlan, Dr. Linda Ferrell, Dr. O.C. Ferrell, Dr. Linda Golden, Dr. Charles Ingene, Dr. Lou Pelton, and Dr. Robert A. Peterson

Abstract and Executive Summary

Direct selling (DS) is simultaneously a business model, a channel of distribution, and an activity engaged in by its distributors. In this paper, we provide a framework for analyzing and discuss academic research on the DS distribution model.

We focus in particular on research that develops economics-based analytic models to examine business and legal issues. This focus is motivated by the fact that analytic models are sometimes used as part of the assessment of whether a DS firm operates a legitimate DS channel or an illegal pyramid scheme. These models potentially have a significant economic impact on, and affect the outcomes of legal cases against, the affected DS firms. They may also be cited in the business press and in academic circles, influencing opinions of the viability or legality of the DS business and distribution model. It is therefore particularly important that such research be carefully grounded in sound logical and analytic bases, and that it appropriately reflect whatever key facts about the firm (or about DS in general) are relevant to the model’s scope of analysis.

We first describe direct selling as an economic activity and business model. We contrast illegal pyramid schemes with legitimate DS firms and outline the key definition of an illegal pyramid scheme. This definition is distinguished from the many possible indicia of pyramid schemes that can result from pyramid scheme operation, but do not themselves prove the existence of a pyramid scheme.

We next define and discuss various logical and analytic errors that can lead to the misdiagnosis of a legitimate DS firm as an illegal pyramid scheme operator. While many such error types are possible, we focus on four that we find to be particularly important in evaluating the analytic literature on DS and pyramid schemes:

  • The “Begging the Question” fallacy, in which the research in effect presumes the existence of a pyramid scheme through its (implicit and/or explicit) assumptions, and as an unsurprising result, concludes the existence of a pyramid scheme;
  • A variant on the “Begging the Question” fallacy in which the research effectively models a pyramid scheme through its omission and/or misrepresentation of substantive facts on which the determination of legality versus illegality depends;
  • The “Fallacy of the Converse,” in which the converse of a true if-then logical statement is incorrectly asserted to be true on the grounds that the original if-then statement is true. For example, even if the statement {if a firm operates a pyramid scheme, then one can expect to see some or all of a set of resulting indicia at some point in time} is reasonably true, it is not automatically true that the converse statement {if one observes a set of pyramid scheme indicia at some point in time, then the firm must be operating a pyramid scheme} is also true; and
  • A special case on the “Fallacy of the Converse,” in which the research ignores standard policies and protections that characterize legitimate DS firms, and therefore starts with an inaccurate premise that these policies and protections do not exist.
  • All of these modeling errors are substantive. This means that correcting any of these errors overturns the model’s results. Such a model is thus not a reliable tool to assess whether a DS firm does, or does not, operate a pyramid scheme.

We apply this framework to the analysis of a recent working paper, “The Alchemy of a Pyramid: Transmutating Business Opportunity Into a Negative Sum Wealth Transfer” by Andrew Stivers, Douglas Smith, and Ginger Zhe Jin (“SSJ”). We find that this research begs the question, omits and/or misrepresents substantive DS firm facts, and commits a fallacy of the converse by omitting consideration of standard DS firm policies that mitigate a pyramid scheme analysis.

Specifically, SSJ “begs the question” of whether or not a DS firm operates an illegal pyramid scheme by explicitly assuming a pyramid scheme in its list of “stylized assumptions” – which duplicate the conditions for a pyramid scheme defined in the Koscot case. Thus, the authors cannot deliver on their research goal of answering the question “What makes an MLM firm a pyramid?”, because they have already assumed the pyramid scheme outcome from the beginning.

Further, SSJ commits another “begging the question” error in explicitly assuming that the firm in its model commits fraud by purposefully misrepresenting the business opportunity to its prospects and distributors. Because a pyramid scheme cannot persist through time without such fraud, the authors again essentially presume a pyramid scheme outcome.

These first two critiques fully invalidate the SSJ research, whose authors state that its goal is to answer the question: “What makes an MLM firm a pyramid?” One cannot achieve this research goal by assuming a pyramid scheme as the basis for a model that then produces the inevitable result that a pyramid scheme exists.

Nevertheless, other errors further weaken the SSJ analysis. Many substantive facts about DS firms – which are important to the resolution of the model’s claimed purpose – are omitted or misrepresented. Among them are:

  • Its omission of any income sources to a distributor other than bonus awarded for mere recruitment without regard to sales (such as retail markup income or the economic benefit of personal consumption at wholesale prices);
  • Its misrepresentation of the basis on which bonus/commission income is awarded by DS firms, by assuming they are only awarded for pure recruitment;
  • Its omission of products that have market value to consumers;
  • Its omission of consideration of distributor differences on substantive dimensions that matter for the research question at hand;
  • Its omission of active choices by distributors concerning what to sell, how hard to work, how to price products for retail sale, how much to invest in training, whether or not to seek to recruit other distributors, or how much to personally consume;
  • Its misrepresentation of the DS firm’s objective as the maximization of one-period profit, with no consideration of the legal implications of the fraud it implies; and
  • Its omission of consideration of standard consumer and distributor protections offered by legitimate DS firms.
  • We discuss other substantive and technical problems with the SSJ model in Appendix B.

The SSJ paper concludes with a set of recommendations to control pyramid scheme threats. Because of the shortcomings we find in the model and analysis, we find that any such recommendations similarly rest on shaky foundations and are unreliable as cures for the question at hand.

We use our framework to offer an analysis of a subset of other economics-based analytic modeling papers in the DS area in Appendix A. We emphasize that our goal is not to argue that all such analyses are flawed. Indeed, economics-based analytic models are productively used in many applications and should continue to be applied to analyze firms’ operations, participants’ decisions, profitability, and growth. We hope that assessment of these efforts will be aided by applying guidelines for reliable and applicable scientific inquiry into various aspects of the DS distribution model. Read full paper